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ABSTRACT 
Quality assurance and labeling play an important and increasing role in firms’ marketing strategies. In almost all 
cases, a price incentive has been stressed as the major incentive for firms to participate in such schemes. We argue 
here that important non-price incentives for participation in quality labeling may exist, too. In German retailing, it 
can be observed that discount retailers are listing more and more foods with quality labels. Processors may then 
participate in voluntary quality labeling in order to enter the large and growing market of discount retailers. The 
price-premium versus the market-entry hypothesis are analyzed theoretically. We investigate then in an empirical 
hedonic pricing model for the German fruit juice market and for participation in the quality label of the Deutsche 
Landwirtschafts-Gesellschaft (DLG) which of the two hypotheses is consistent with the data. There is strong support 
for the market-entry hypothesis. 
Keywords: Labeling; price premium; market entry; fruit juice market; DLG award 
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1 Introduction  
Quality assurance and labeling play an important and increasing role in firms’ marketing strategies. 
Manufacturers utilize these tools in order to gain or to keep market shares on horizontally and vertically 
differentiated food markets. The labeling of foods may address a large number of intrinsic quality 
attributes valued by consumers. Those quality attributes refer to, e.g., food safety, nutrition, sensoric or 
organoleptic analyses, the value and function of a product or its production process. Food labels may also 
contain quality signals like the country or region of origin of a product or test results of quality assurance 
schemes with regard to, e.g., certification or traceability (CASWELL and ANDERS 2011, p. 475).  
In the recent literature, quality assurance and labeling have mainly been seen as instruments of product 
proliferation that may lead to a price premium and, consequently, to producer gains. The main emphasis 
has been placed on the measurement of consumers’ willingness to pay for quality attributes. It was 
elaborated that some willingness to pay does exist for quality attributes such as ecological (CRANFIELD, 
DEATON and SHELLIKERI 2009), GM-free (LUSK et al. 2006) or pesticide-free production (ROOSEN 1998) and 
health benefits in foods (MARETTE et al. 2010). Moreover, quality signals like the regional origin of 
specialty foods (LOUREIRO and MCCLUSKEY 2000) or third-party certification of production standards (JAHN, 
SCHRAMM and SPILLER 2005) are also associated with a positive willingness to pay. In an increasing number 
of studies, various quality attributes were introduced jointly and the differential marginal willingness to 
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pay was quantified (WEST et al. 2002; GAO and SCHROEDER 2009; APRILE, CAPUTO and NAYGA 2012). 
Consequently, the introduction of quality labels has been regarded as a marketing tool to raise prices and 
producer gains (FOTOPOULOS and KRYSTALLIS 2003).  
It has been widely ignored in this literature that price advantages are only one possible option for 
manufacturers to gain from increasing product quality and its labeling. Therefore, it will be analyzed in 
this paper what kind of incentives may drive firms in their decisions to participate in quality assurance and 
labeling. Two hypotheses will be formulated theoretically and it will be tested empirically for a highly 
differentiated food industry whether one of these hypotheses is consistent with the data. The empirical 
analysis focuses on the German fruit juice market and on the incentives for firms to participate in a 
voluntary quality label, i.e. the DLG label. The article is organized as follows.  
After the Introduction, a brief overview of major developments on the German fruit juice market will be 
provided in Section 2. Then, in Section 3, two theoretical hypotheses will be derived. The first hypothesis 
refers to the traditional view that a price premium is the major incentive for participation in quality 
labeling. According to the second and opposite hypothesis, firms may gain mainly from non-price 
incentives of quality labels. In Section 4, a hedonic pricing model will be specified and, based on primary 
data collected for the German fruit juice market, is utilized for an assessment of the two alternative 
hypotheses. Conclusions will be drawn in Section 5. 
2 The German Fruit Juice Market: Market Development and Quality Labeling 
Some background information on the development and structure of the German fruit juice market and on 
voluntary quality labeling in that market is necessary in order to put the empirical analysis into 
perspective. Therefore, an overview of demand for beverages in general and fruit juice in particular will 
be provided as well as characteristics of the marketing channel. Secondly, the most important voluntary 
quality labeling scheme on the German fruit juice market, the DLG label, will be described and compared 
with other quality signals like national brands and publicly available quality assessments. 
2.1 Market Structure and Development 
Some aggregate indicators of the German consumption of beverages and of the role of fruit juice on the 
beverage market are shown in Table 1. 
 
Table 1. 
Consumption of Beverages in Germany, 1990-2010 (Liters per Capita) 
Category 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010a) 
Alcoholic beverages 174.5 165.0 155.7 144.7 131.9 
Non-alcoholic beverages 209.6 230.6 253.1 288.6 290.2 
 among those:      
• Bottled water   85.0   97.1 106.8 135.0 135.7 
• Soft drinks and others   85.0   89.7 105.7 113.5 118.2 
• Fruit juice 
(Apple) 
((Orange)) 
  39.6 
    (8.4) 
    ((8.6)) 
  40.7 
  (11.8) 
    ((9.8)) 
  40.6 
  (12.1) 
    ((9.5)) 
  40.1 
  (12.4) 
    ((8.9)) 
  36.3 
    (8.1) 
    ((8.7)) 
Hot and home beverages 324.6 295.5 291.4 324.9 327.2 
All beverages 708.7 691.1 700.2 758.2 749.3 
a) Preliminary values.  
Source: BMELV, Table 311, various years. 
On the German beverage market, per-capita consumption of alcoholic beverages, in particular beer, has 
declined continuously. Despite this, overall per-capita consumption of beverages by German consumers 
has risen. Responsible for the growth on the German beverage market are strong increases in per-capita 
consumption of non-alcoholic beverages with bottled water, soft drinks and miscellaneous non-alcoholic 
beverages being the categories booming most. Hot and home beverages such as coffee, tea and milk have 
kept their per-capita consumption after a decline from 1990 to 2000 and a reversal of that trend since 
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then. 
Fruit juice consumption fell from 39.6 (1990) to 36.3 (2010) liters per capita and year and, thus, to 12.5 % 
of non-alcoholic beverage consumption in Germany. Despite this loss of market share in quantity terms, 
Germany has been the country with the highest per-capita consumption of fruit juice in the European 
Union for years. The country is followed by Finland (31.2 liters per capita and year in 2010), Austria (28.7 
liters) and the Netherlands (27.9 liters) [VdF 2011]. Moreover, fruit juice is a typical high-value product in 
the beverage industry with a higher relative importance in value rather than in quantity terms. Table 1 
shows for Germany that orange juice (8.7 liters) and apple juice (8.1 liters) dominate the per-capita 
consumption of fruit juices, followed by different nectars. 
It is an essential feature of German retailing that the share of discounters is very high and has grown 
substantially. Table 2 shows that the major share of non-alcoholic beverages in Germany is distributed by 
discounters, followed by large department stores (≥ 1,500 m2) and traditional retailers and supermarkets 
(≤ 1,499 m2). The discounters’ market share increased from 35.0 % in 2002 to 55.3 % in 2010, at the 
expense of all other types of retailers. The loss of market share was particularly strong for beverage retail 
markets with a decline from 17.4 % (2002) to 7.6 % (2010). 
Table 2. 
Marketing Channels for Non-alcoholic Beverages in Germany, 2002-2010 (%) 
Marketing channels 2002 2006 2010 
Discounters 35.0 50.8 55.3 
Large department stores  
(≥ 1,500 m2) 
29.4 23.3 22.7 
Traditional retailers and 
supermarkets (≤ 1,499 m2) 
13.7 10.0 12.2 
Beverage retail markets 14.4 12.3   7.6 
Other retailers   4.5   3.6   2.2 
Source: GfK Consumer Scan. 
Further interesting characteristics of the German market for non-alcoholic beverages are structural 
changes in packaging, towards non-returnable bottles, and the fact that private labels have gained in 
importance. The increasing role of private labels, however, is associated with some very strong national 
brands on the non-alcoholic beverage market and, in particular, the fruit juice market.  
2.2 Quality Labeling for Non-alcoholic Beverages in Germany 
The analysis of benefits from quality labeling for individual firms is closely related to the recent literature 
on private and collective reputation (WINFREE and MCCLUSKEY 2005; COSTANIGRO and MCCLUSKEY 2011). On 
the German fruit juice market, like for other processed foods, a number of different quality labels do exist 
which either signal private or collective reputation. A hierarchy of quality signals seems to exist. Firstly, 
market leaders typically advertise their national brands heavily which indicates private reputation. Often, 
rather large price premia are associated with the leading national brands (BROCKMEIER 1993, p. 181). 
Market followers cannot afford to advertise their brands at a large scale, but are still interested in 
signaling product quality. Here, quality labels provided by independent agencies represent important 
signals of fruit-juice quality. Two most important labels include the DLG label and the mark of quality 
published by Stiftung Warentest. The DLG label is based on applications and voluntary participation, 
whereas Stiftung Warentest evaluates products that are selected by the institution. 
The DLG label is awarded by the German Agricultural Society (Deutsche Landwirtschafts-Gesellschaft, 
DLG), an association founded in 1885 in order to promote technical and scientific progress. In the DLG 
Test Center Food, more than 27,000 foods are tested annually in DLG Quality Tests mainly according to 
sensory analysis. For several product groups, sensory analysis is complemented by “food preparation 
tests, inspections of the packaging and labeling, as well as chemical, microbiological and physical analyses 
in accredited laboratories” (DLG 2012, p. 4). DLG awards in Gold, Silver and Bronze are given annually to 
food products of superior quality. In two studies, the importance of such tests under the DLG label for 
beverage prices have been analyzed in detail. WENZEL (2002) utilized unpublished background information 
of DLG tests such as chemical and sensory criteria in the explanation of prices for apple juice; she 
elaborated a rather strong effect of those indicators of objective juice quality on prices. SCHAMEL (2003) 
introduced the DLG awards directly in his hedonic price analysis for wine and detected statistically 
significant impacts of DLG awards as well as quality grades on wine prices. 
Simon Bleich and Roland Herrmann / Int. J. Food System Dynamics 4 (1), 2013, 51-63 
54 
Stiftung Warentest is a German consumer organization and foundation, located in Berlin. It compares 
goods and services and publishes reports on the comparisons in an own magazine, i.e. “test”, and on its 
homepage (Stiftung Warentest, 2011). Stiftung Warentest is supposed to provide objective information on 
product quality. To a large extent, Stiftung Warentest is self-financing. It is only partly funded by the 
Federal Ministry of Food, Agriculture and Consumer Protection as a compensation for publishing 
advertising-free publications. Products are classified on the basis of five different grades (very good, good, 
satisfactory, adequate, and unsatisfactory).  
There is some evidence from other products such as cheese that national brands, followed by the label 
“Bio”, experience the highest price premia whereas the premium for the DLG label and a positive 
assessment of Stiftung Warentest are lower (HERRMANN and SCHRÖCK 2012). Additionally, empirical and 
theoretical contributions suggest that consumers distinguish between different certification systems 
when assessing quality labels (JANSEN and HAMM 2012) and that the reliability of certification is crucial 
(JAHN, SCHRAMM and SPILLER 2005). 
3 Theoretical Considerations: Price versus Non-price Incentives in Quality Assurance 
and Labeling 
The economic rationale for quality assurance and label schemes is based on quality uncertainty by 
consumers. Differentiated food markets are often characterized by an information asymmetry with regard 
to product quality between producers and consumers as the consumers’ information on product quality is 
incomplete. Therefore, quality assurance and labeling schemes may provide the needed information 
and/or quality signals which reduce consumers’ search costs. Quality assurance and labeling may thus 
raise consumers’ welfare. If they succeed to raise society’s welfare, too, they will be a useful tool to avoid 
market failure and to strengthen the functioning of the market mechanism (see, e.g., HERRMANN and 
TEUBER 2011). 
In the following analysis of private incentives to join quality assurance and labeling schemes, it is not this 
information-economic perspective that is in our focus. The self-interest of firms to participate in such 
schemes is our primary interest. 
We posit for the following analysis that a firm produces a high-quality product. Consumers, however, will 
not be able to distinguish the high-quality product from a lower-quality mass product. Given this 
background, there could be at least two motivations for a firm to participate in a voluntary labeling 
scheme which causes additional costs: 
 
1. The firm can be interested in the price premium it could get in the situation with a certified quality label 
compared to the non-labeled market. We call this the price-premium hypothesis for a participation in the 
quality labeling scheme. 
2. The firm can be interested in the label, too, since retailing firms expect from their processors that their 
products are quality-labeled. If a quality label allows the firm to be listed with its product by retailers and to 
enter a larger market, the firm’s decision to participate in the labeling scheme may be worthwhile. It is 
possible that larger quantities can be sold on a continuous basis. The incentive may even prevail if no price 
premium is associated with the market of the high-quality product. We call this the market-entry 
hypothesis for the participation in the quality labeling scheme. 
 
The first hypothesis is illustrated in Figure 1. Suppose that the firm initially faces the demand curve D1 for 
its already existing high-quality product. The firm’s supply curve is S1, i.e. marginal costs are rising. If the 
firm sells on a competitive market, the equilibrium price is p1 at which the firm sells quantity q1. Producer 
surplus is equal to area (a + b). Participation in quality labeling would help consumers to better identify 
the high-quality product and demand would shift to the right, from D1 to D2. Quality labeling would induce 
additional costs, too. Even if the high quality was introduced in the past and no additional costs of 
production and quality assurance occur, there will be costs for quality control by the certification agency. 
Additionally, there will be marketing costs due to a new package design with the quality label. Thus, 
marginal costs are raised and the supply curve shifts to the left - from S1 to S2. This yields a new market 
price p2 at which the supply curve S2 and the demand curve D2 intersect. For the individual firm, p2 is a 
gross price from which the marginal costs of quality labeling have to be deducted in order to get the net 
price p2’. As far as the label-induced shift of the demand curve is stronger than the supply shift, the 
individual firm receives an increasing net price. The net price after participation in the quality-labeling 
scheme has to be compared with the initial price in the non-labeling situation. In Figure 1, the firm gains 
in terms of producer surplus the area (c + d + e) due to participation in the quality-labeling scheme. 
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It is this incentive that has been stressed in the literature many times. Most notably, DESENICU et al. (2011) 
survey 16 studies in which price premia for geographical indications in food products were computed. The 
authors regard the price premium, compared to a generic reference product, as a success indicator for 
geographical indications. They estimate in a meta-study which determinants affect the price premium and 
to what extent. 
p
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Figure 1. The Price Incentive for Participation in Quality Assurance and Labeling (Hypothesis 1) 
    Source: Own presentation 
 
The second hypothesis is illustrated in Figure 2. A situation is shown in which a firm might gain from entry 
to a large market with a quality label even if its price premium would become negative. We posit that the 
firm originally produced and marketed a high-quality product already, but without a certified quality label. 
In this case, there was a situation of monopolistic competition for the firm. It was possible to sell the high-
quality good at a price above the mass-market price, but associated with high search costs of consumers 
and a very small market for its product. According to Figure 2, the firm faced a demand curve D1 for the 
high-quality product with an associated marginal revenue curve MR1. Under profit maximization and with 
marginal costs MC1, the optimum quantity was q1. According to the Cournot point C, the firm realized the 
price p1 for q1 under monopolistic competition. The optimum solution was associated with a producer 
surplus of area (a + b + c + d), i.e. the difference between earnings (a + b + c + d + e) and variable costs 
(area e). 
A participation in the quality-labeling scheme may now be the entrance ticket to a large-volume market 
for the high-quality product, if retailers ask for quality-labeled products from the processors. The growing 
German market of discount retailers is a case in point. Suppose that D2 is the retailers’ demand function 
for the firm’s high-quality product with a quality label. As price competition will be much stronger on the 
large-volume market, we posit that the firm can no longer set its price above marginal costs. With a 
certified quality label, the firm can move from its market niche and the demand curve D1 to the large-
volume market of discounters with retailers’ market demand D2. Under competitive pricing, the firm may 
sell q2 where its new marginal cost curve intersects the retailers’ demand curve D2 for the firm’s product. 
The price consumers pay is p2. The producer price for the firm’s product falls from p1 in the niche-market 
situation without quality label to p’2 on the large-volume market where the quantity sold rises 
substantially, i.e. from q1 to q2. The firm’s net price is the consumer price on the market of discount 
retailers, i.e. p2, minus the marginal costs of participating in quality labeling. Producer surplus with a 
certified quality label is now as high as area (a + b + f +g + h ) and the impact of the quality label on 
producer surplus is (a + b + f + g + h – a – b – c - d). Compared to the non-labeling situation, the firm 
experiences a welfare gain if the area (f + g + h) exceeds area (c +d). 
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Figure 2. A Non-price Incentive for Participation in Quality Assurance and Labeling (Hypothesis 2) 
Source: Own presentation. 
It is the strategy of discounters which makes the market-entry hypothesis a very plausible rationale for 
participation in voluntary certified labeling. 
We will now provide empirical evidence for the German fruit juice market in order to test whether one of 
the two hypotheses seems compatible with the findings. 
4 Empirical Analysis: A Hedonic Pricing Model of the Quality-Price Linkage on the  
German Fruit Juice Market 
In this Section, hedonic pricing models capturing the influence of product characteristics on the price of 
fruit juices in Germany will be developed, estimated and interpreted. We start with the empirical model 
and explain then the data. Finally, we provide the econometric estimates and the economic interpretation 
of results. 
4.1 The Empirical Model 
The empirical model is based on hedonic price analysis. The theoretical basis of hedonic pricing models is 
a consumer theory along the lines of LANCASTER (1966). According to LANCASTER and other authors of 
characteristics models, the characteristics of products rather than their quantities enter the consumers’ 
utility functions. This approach is consistent with differentiated product markets in which heterogeneous 
preferences of consumers are satisfied. When an additional product characteristic is added to a product 
this will affect consumers’ utilities, i.e. the demand side, and/or the marginal costs of providing the 
characteristic, i.e. the supply side. ROSEN (1974) stressed the supply-and-demand character of hedonic 
pricing models. On a competitive market, implicit prices of product characteristics are affected by their 
implications for demand and supply. In COSTANIGRO and MCCLUSKEY (2011), the methodological foundation 
of hedonic pricing models is presented, applications to food market analysis are surveyed and future 
challenges are elaborated.  
The basic hedonic price function is then a reduced form of the supply and demand for products with 
varying quality characteristics. The dependent variable, i.e. the price of a product i (pi) is linked to the 
product i’s characteristics zij with j = 1, …, n: 
).z,...,z(fp ni 1=(1)  
In the following empirical analysis, we specify the dependent variable in logarithms and introduce various 
groups of independent variables: 
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The vector LABELik captures variables that indicate whether certain quality labels k are valid for product i. 
The vector QUALITYil characterizes variables that describe the fruit juice in terms of its objective or 
subjective quality. Variables which comprise the product’s distribution in the marketing chain as well as 
retailing strategies are covered under the vector CHAINim. Quite a number of variables, some of which are 
summarized in the Appendix, were used under these vectors during the specification search. 
The final models shown in Section 4.3 are based on estimations in which all coefficients were statistically 
significant at least at the 95 %-level. They are based on the following specification for apple juice: 
 
 · 
 ·+
 · + ·+ ·+=(3)
1098
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3210
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  · CLOUDY + α · GLASS + αJUICE · DIRECT_ + αPACKSIZElnα
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and the following one for orange juice: 
.
  
(4)
8
765
43210
II
III
IIIII
  +  εRE · BEV_STO+ ß
 PRICE · UNIFORM  +  ß · GLASS  +  ßJUICE · DIRECT_+ ß
PACKSIZEln ·   +  ß · BRAND + ß · ORGANIC  +  ßEL · DLG_LAB + ß  =  ßpln
 
pi (pI) is the price of apple juice i (orange juice I) with i = 238 (I = 182) in €/liter. The variables DLG_LABEL, 
ORGANIC and BRAND stand for the existence of a quality label – in the first two cases – and for the 
existence of a national brand in the latter case. For all three variables, the dummy variable becomes unity 
(zero) if the quality signal does exist (not exist).  
The signs of  and  indicate whether the price-premium or the market-entry hypothesis is consistent 
with the data. The higher  and , the more likely is that the price-premium hypothesis holds. 
However, as we cannot observe equilibrium quantities, there is only one case where we can distinguish 
between the two hypotheses with certainty:  < 0 and  < 0 imply that the market-entry hypothesis is 
supported by the data.  
The variables PACKSIZE, DIRECT_JUICE, GLASS and CLOUDY belong to the vector QUALITY. They are 
indicators of objective or subjective fruit-juice quality. PACKSIZE, as a metric variable, measures the 
package size of a fruit juice sold. DIRECT_JUICE takes the value unity (zero) if fruit juice is processed from 
fresh fruit directly (from fruit concentrate). GLASS indicates that the package of the fruit juice is a glass 
bottle (another material than glass) if the variable is unity (zero). CLOUDY stands for a clouded (clear) 
apple juice if the value of the dummy variable is unity (zero). 
The variables REGDISTR, LARGECITY, UNIFORMPRICE and BEV_STORE are part of the vector CHAIN. They 
capture facts about how fruit juices are marketed by retailers and processors in the marketing chain. The 
dummy variables illustrate whether the processor of a fruit juice is distributing the fruit juice only 
regionally (REGDISTR=1) or nationwide (REGDISTR=0), whether the price observation comes from the 
larger city (LARGECITY=1) or the smaller city (LARGECITY=0), and whether the fruit was distributed by a 
beverage retail market (BEV_STORE=1) or not (BEV_STORE=0). In some cases, it was observed that some 
national brands were sold at the same or nearly the same price. The dummy variable UNIFORMPRICE 
received the value unity (zero) if this situation was given (not given). 
Apart from models (3) and (4), alternative model specifications will be presented in Section 4.3 which 
refer to the detailed awards of the DLG label rather than its existence. The variable DLG_LABEL in 
equations (3) and (4) will then be substituted by the awards GOLD, SILVER and BRONZE, respectively. 
4.2 Data 
Two primary data sets were collected and used in the following empirical analysis. Data refer to juices 
supplied in December 2010 in the retailing sector of two German cities: (i) Cologne and (ii) Baden-Baden. 
Cologne stands for larger and Baden-Baden for smaller West German cities. The study covered 182 juices 
offered in Cologne, namely 105 apple juices and 77 orange juices, and 238 juices in Baden-Baden, namely 
133 apple and 105 orange juices. For all juices sold, the following product characteristics were collected 
and incorporated: producer, brand, retailer, price, size and type of packaging, and quality labels. 
The individual juices were then assigned to DLG awards provided in three different editions of the 
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magazine “DLG Test Lebensmittel”: 04/2008, 05/2009 and 05/2010. Older issues of the magazine which 
contained awards for fruit juices, too, were ignored as firms are allowed to advertise their DLG awards for 
24 months only after its receipt. Thus, 145 fruit juices could be identified that had received a Gold, Silver 
or Bronze award under the DLG label. Among these were 88 apple and 57 orange juices. 
Descriptive statistics of the sample of juices are summarized in the Appendix. 238 apple and 182 orange 
juices are covered in the sample. There was a mean price of 1.29 €/liter for apple juice and of 1.41 €/liter 
for orange juice. In some respects, the sample of apple juices is very similar to the sample of orange 
juices. In both cases, the private-label share of all juices was between 30 and 40 % and the share of 
national brands dominated. Moreover, the share of organic fruit juices was low compared to conventional 
ones. The conventional share was close to 90 % on both markets. Similar is also the share of products with 
DLG award: It ranges between 30 and 40 % for both apple and orange juice. 
A difference is that more regional suppliers are active on the market for apple juice (28.6 compared to 17 
%) and that glass packaging is clearly more important for apple juice (36.6 compared to 26.4 %) compared 
to orange juice. Even stronger is the difference with regard to the role of direct juice: Its share is as high 
as 48.7 % for apple juice, but only 12.6 % for orange juice. This difference is plausible as high transport 
costs for oranges will lead to a stark cost advantage of processing orange juice from fruit concentrate 
rather than from fruits directly. For apple juice, the importance of the market segment of cloudy juice is 
visible (48.7 %). In the case of orange juice, there is an interesting market segment with fruit pulp, but it is 
rather small and covers only 6.6 % of all juices. 
4.3 Results and Interpretation 
Four selected estimations are presented in Table 3. In the first place, all estimations are inconsistent with 
Hypothesis 1 but consistent with Hypothesis 2. Apparently, the evidence supports the market-entry 
hypothesis.  
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Table 3. 
Quality Labels and Other Determinants Affecting Fruit Juice Prices in Germany 
Explanatory Variables 
Apple Juice Orange Juice 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Constant    -0.0467  
  (-1.25) 
   -0.0489*** 
  (-1.29) 
   -0.3089*** 
  (-5.92) 
    0.0145 
   (0.54) 
DLG_LABEL    -0.2084*** 
  (-5.41)  
   -0.0887** 
  (-2.60)  
GOLD     -0.2209***   (-3.97)  
   -0.0841 
  (-1.54) 
SILVER     -0.2206***   (-5.60)  
   -0.1062* 
  (-2.23) 
BRONZE     -0.1484*   (-2.10)  
   -0.0932** 
  (-2.65) 
BRAND     0.1627*** 
   (4.07) 
    0.1639*** 
   (4.13) 
    0.2476*** 
   (6.16) 
    0.2450*** 
   (5.96) 
ORGANIC     0.1703** 
   (3.27) 
    0.1705*** 
   (3.19) 
    0.3507*** 
   (7.14) 
    0.3578*** 
   (7.40) 
ln PACKSIZE    -0.3463*** 
  (-8.90) 
   -0.3487*** 
  (-8.85)  
   -0.2110*** 
  (-7.08) 
PACKSIZE b)      -0.2853***   (-6.31)  
CLOUDY     0.1116** 
  (2.82) 
    0.1068** 
   (2.80)   
REGDISTR    0.2412*** 
   (4.01) 
    0.2413*** 
   (3.91)   
LARGECITY    -0.1223** 
  (-2.89) 
   -0.1235** 
  (-2.92)   
UNIFORMPRICE     0.2591*** 
   (6.55) 
    0.2624*** 
   (6.55) 
    0.1319*** 
   (3.40) 
    0.1334*** 
   (3.45) 
DIRECT_JUICE     0.1038** 
   (2.66) 
    0.1107** 
   (2.86) 
    0.3049*** 
   (6.88) 
    0.3198*** 
   (6.78) 
GLASS       0.0952*    (2.02) 
    0.1291** 
   (2.67) 
BEV_STORE       0.0950*    (2.01)  
     0.531     0.529     0.572     0.574 
F   30.87***   25.24***   31.18***   28.08*** 
N 238 238 182 182 
 Heteroscedasticity–robust t-values according to White are computed. All variables are explained in the text. 
   ***, **, * indicate the 99.9 %-, 99 %-, 95 %-levels of statistical significance for two-sided tests. - b) Model 3 is a 
general log-lin model, i.e. the variable PACKSIZE is not converted into logarithms. 
source: Authors’ computations. 
 
Participation in the quality-labeling scheme for apple and orange juices is, ceteris paribus, associated with 
a lower price than non-participation.  
The coefficients of the variable DLG_LABEL are statistically significantly negative in Model 1 (apple juice) 
and Model 3 (orange juice), and the coefficients of the disaggregated DLG awards GOLD, SILVER, and 
BRONZE are significantly negative, too. In general, the negative price premium is higher for apple juice 
than for orange juice. Our rationale for the negative coefficients is that quality-labeled products are 
becoming more and more the standard on the growing market for discounters in German grocery 
retailing. Apparently, it is attractive for those processors, who do not offer the leading brands, to enter 
this growing and stable market. This even holds if a negative price premium occurs compared to a more 
individual market segment in a hypothetical situation without DLG award. 
It is important to control for a number of other determinants of fruit juice prices. In the following 
interpretation, we concentrate mainly on the results of Models 1 and 3. National brands capture 
significantly higher prices than their counterparts and the price premia of national brands are clearly 
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higher for orange than for apple juice. Organic fruit juice realizes a price premium compared to 
conventional fruit juices, too, that is again significantly higher for orange than for apple juice. Whereas 
the price premium associated with the characteristic ORGANIC is higher than that for BRAND in the case 
of orange juice, the two premia are nearly identical for both variables in the case of apple juice. A 
significant price premium is earned by direct juice relative to juice from concentrate, both for apple juice 
and – to a larger extent – for orange juice.  
A cost-oriented determinant of fruit juice prices is the package size. A one-percent increase in the 
package size lowers the price of apple juice by 0.35 % (Model 1) and of orange juice by 0.29 % (Model 3). 
Fruit juice prices are rising if processors’ market position is so strong that their brands are uniformly 
priced, and more so for apple than for orange juice.  
Some other price determinants are only significant for either apple or orange juice. For cloudy apple 
juices, a price premium can be captured compared to clear apple juices. Regionally distributed apple 
juices also receive a price advantage compared to nationally distributed juices and, in general, apple juice 
is cheaper in the large city than the smaller city. A significant positive price difference occurs for orange 
juice sold in beverage retail markets compared to other retail stores.  
Table 4 allows additional findings on the magnitude of the impact of the dummy variables. As Table 3 
contains equations with the logarithm of prices as the dependent variable and many dummy variables on 
the right–hand side, the approach by HALVORSEN and PALMQUIST (1980) is applied. With a DLG award, a 
negative price premium of 18.8 % for apple juice and of 8.5 % for orange juice occurs. However, high 
positive premia are associated with other characteristics of fruit juice, too. For apple juice, it is 29.6 % if 
firms can realize uniform pricing for their products, 18.6 % for organic apple juice and 17.7 % for national 
brands. For cloudy and direct apple juice, the price premia are higher than 10 %, too. 
 
Table 4. 
The Percentage Impact of Quality Labels and Other Characteristics on Fruit Juice Prices in 
Germanya) 
Explanatory Variables Apple Juice Orange Juice 
DLG_LABEL -18.8 -8.5 
GOLD -19.8 -8.1 
SILVER -19.8 -10.1 
BRONZE -13.8 -8.9 
BRAND +17.7 +28.1 
CLOUDY +11.8  
REGDISTR +27.3  
LARGECITY -11.5  
UNIFORMPRICE +29.6 +14.1 
ORGANIC +18.6 +42.0 
DIRECT_JUICE +10.9 +35.6 
GLASS  +10.0 
BEV_STORE  +10.0 
a)   Computed with the equation by HALVORSEN/PALMQUIST (1980), on the basis of the regression coefficients of the dummy 
variables shown in Table 3. The results are based on Model 1 for apple juice and on Model 3 for orange juice. The 
results for the variables GOLD, SILVER and BRONZE are based on Models 2 and 4 respectively.  
Source: Authors‘ computations 
 
In the case of orange juice, some characteristics are associated with even higher percentage price premia: 
organic orange juices gain a premium of 42.0 %, direct juices of 35.6 % and the national brands of 28.1 % 
compared to their counterparts. 
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5 Conclusions 
The literature on quality assessment and labeling is dominated by contributions in which the existence of 
a price premium is viewed as the major incentive for participation. However, there may be other 
incentives for firms to participate in voluntary quality labeling. Discounters in particular offer an 
increasing share of quality-labeled products. Participation in voluntary quality labeling may become a pre-
condition for food manufacturers to enter the growing market of discount retailers. We called this the 
market-entry hypothesis and analyzed for the German fruit juice market whether participation in the 
voluntary DLG quality labeling is consistent with either the market-entry hypothesis or the traditional 
price-premium hypothesis. The analysis confirms for orange and apple juice that the voluntary DLG award 
is associated with a negative price premium. This is only consistent with the market-entry hypothesis. 
It seems that the leading juice manufacturers have invested in private quality reputations already and 
realized a price premium for their reputation – as indicated by the coefficient of the BRAND variable. 
Apparently, they do not need to participate in voluntary quality labeling such as the DLG label 
additionally. Manufacturers whose private quality reputation is still lower find it more attractive to 
participate in voluntary DLG labeling and use its collective reputation for entering new markets and 
signaling the quality of their products. 
It might be that the main result of this paper is fruit-juice specific. SCHAMEL (2003), e.g., found that DLG 
quality labeling induced price premia for award-winning wines. What can be observed, however, for some 
other markets like ice cream or beer is that the situation seems to be similar to fruit juice. Participants in 
voluntary labeling on those markets are not the leading manufacturers who have already an established 
high-quality reputation for their products. They are rather followers who have to signal the quality of their 
products with indicators of collective reputation to retailers and consumers. Therefore, it seems 
necessary and interesting to analyze in future research whether the market-entry hypothesis is a much 
more general explanation for participation in quality labeling than for fruit juices alone. 
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Appendix:  Descriptive Statistics on the Data Base: Product Characteristics of Fruit Juices in the 
Samplea) 
Product 
Characteristics 
Apple Juice Orange Juice 
n % n % 
Cloudy  
Clear 
110 
128 
46.2 
53.8 
  
With fruit pulp 
Without fruit pulp 
    12 
170 
  6.6 
93.4 
Direct juice 
Juice from concentrate 
116 
122 
48.7 
51.3 
  23 
159 
12.6 
87.4 
Tetrapak/Elopak 
PET 
Glass 
  94 
  57 
  87 
39.5 
23.9 
36.6 
  78 
  56 
  48 
42.9 
30.8 
26.4 
Discounters 
Supermarkets, large department 
stores, other retailers 
Beverage retail markets 
  33 
 
173 
  32 
13.9 
 
72.7 
13.4 
  29 
 
       128 
         25 
15.9 
 
70.3 
13.7 
Private label 
National brand 
  77 
161 
32.4 
67.6 
  65 
117 
35.7 
64.3 
Regional supply 
Nationwide supply 
  68 
170 
28.6 
71.4 
  31 
151 
17.0 
83.0 
Organic production 
Conventional juices 
  26 
212 
10.9 
89.1 
  15 
167 
  8.2 
91.8 
No DLG award 
With DLG award 
150 
  88 
63.0 
37.0 
125 
  57 
68.7 
31.3 
Gold 
Silver 
Bronze 
  35 
  38 
  15 
14.7 
16.0 
  6.3 
  17 
  28 
  12 
  9.3 
15.4 
  6.6 
Package with DLG label 
Package with any label 
  36 
  49 
15.1 
20.6 
  20 
  30 
11.0 
16.5 
a) The total sample consists of 238 apple juices and 182 orange juices. 
Source: Own presentation and computations. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
